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ABSTRACT
This study uses tax return data for U.S. nonfinancial corporations for
the period 1971-82 to estimate the importance of restrictions on the ability
of firms to use tax credits and to obtain refunds for tax losses. Our results
suggest that the incidence of such unused tax benefits increased substantially
during the early 1980s, though we do not find these increases attributable to
increased investment incentives during that period.
Using estimates of a three-state (taxable, not taxable, partially
taxable) transition probability model, we calculate the effective tax rates on
various types of investments undertaken by firms differing with respect to tax
status. We confirm previous findings about the marginal tax rate on interest
payments, and that it is important to distinguish current tax payments from
marginal tax rates in estimating the incentive to invest.
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The asymmetric treatment of gains and losses by the corporate income tax
has figured prominently in many areas of research about the effects of
taxation on firm behavior. One theory of capital structure has focused on the
limited deductibility of marginal interest payments to explain the existence
of optimal interior debt-equity ratios (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). Another
area of research has considered the impact of the limited loss offset
mechanism on the cost of capital and investment incentives (Auerbach 1983,
1986, Cooper and Franks 1983, Majd and Myers 1985, Mayer 1986, Mintz 1985).
Yet another line of research has focused on the incentives to transfer
unusable tax benefits through leasing (Warren and Auerbach 1982) or merging
(Auerbach and Reishus 1987).
The recent tax reform process in the U.S. has paid particular attention
to this characteristic of the tax code, without any consistent view emerging
about the appropriate treatment of tax losses. Legislation in 1981
liberalized the treatment of leasing to obtain tax benefits, but this
provision was repealed in 1982. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduces the
ability of firms to transfer tax benefits through merger activity, and applies
a corporate minimum tax to firms whose losses were attributable to various
deviations of taxable income from book income.
When considering the impact of the asymmetric treatment of tax losses,
and the reform of such provisions, it is important to have a sense of their
quantitative importance. Few studies have provided empirical estimates of the
importance of unused tax benefits in the economy. A primary reason is the—2—
lack of data on the tax status of individual corporations. Oneexception is
Cordes and Sheffrin (1983), who, using confidential data on the tax returns of
corporations for a single year, estimated the average effective marginal tax
rate at which corporate interest payments could be deducted. Auerbach and
Poterba (1987b) estimated the size and distribution of tax losscarryforwards
and their impact on investment incentives using data collected from theannual
reports of several hundred large corporations representing a significant
fraction of the value of the corporate sector. However, they concludeon the
basis of indirect evidence that they may have seriously underestimated the
magnitude of aggregate tax loss carryforwards.
The current study extends these previous efforts in several important
ways. Like Cordes and Sheffrin, we use confidential tax return data available
from the U.S. Treasury. However, our sample is a panel of firmsover the
period 1971-1982, rather than a single year's cross-section. This is an
important difference, since the effective marginal tax rate for a firm ina
given year depends on its status in previous and subsequentyears. A firm
with a current loss could be fully taxable at the margin, forexample, because
of its ability to offset the loss against previous gains.Following Auerbach
and Poterba, we estimate the quantitative importance of tax losses and their
impact on the incentive to invest. However, we also consider the additional
effects of the limitations on the use of investment and foreign tax creditsby
taxable firms. Such credit limitations appear to affectmany more firms than
does the inability to deduct losses, so their inclusion in theanalysis is
important if one is to gain an accurate understanding of the effects of tax
law asymmetries on corporate behavior.—3-
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
discussion of the relevant U.S. tax law. Section 3 describes the data that
formed the basis for our analysis. Next, section 4 presents aggregate and
industry statistics on the importance of loss and credit limitations. Section
5 presents a general algorithm for using a three-state, second-order
transition model for the tax status of the firm to estimate effective marginal
tax rates. Section 6 presents estimates of such a model and the effective
marginal tax rate distribution they imply. Section 7 discusses the effects of
tax constraints on the incentive for corporate investment, and Section 8
offers concluding comments and suggestions for future research in this area.
2.Constraints on the Use of Tax Benefits
The corporate tax in the U.S. is essentially a flat rate tax on taxable
income.1 Like most other countries, however, the U.S. does not provide
corporations with a "full loss offset" that would treat positive and negative
tax bases symmetrically. Instead, it imposes a different set of provisions
for firms with negative taxable income. Moreover, it does not allow a full
use of tax credits applicable to taxes payable even for firms which have
positive taxable income before credits.
Corporations calculate their taxes payable in two stages. They first
estimate taxes due before credits, and then apply credits to reduce taxes as
allowed. The constraint on losses applies at the former stage, before credits
are considered. Only after the effect of this constraint has been calculated
do credits, and constraints on credits, enter the tax computation.-4-
A. Losses
In a given tax year, a firm calculates its taxable income before credits.
If it is positive, no loss constraints apply and it goes on to the credit
calculation. If it is negative, it must "carry" the loss "back" (to an
earlier year) or "forward" (to a subsequent year). Carrying back entails
recomputing the tax return of at least one of the previous three years,
beginning with the earliest of the three, deducting the current loss from the
previous years' taxable income. Thus, if the current loss is smaller in
absolute value than the carryback potential of the previous three years, the
firm can carry all current losses back. At the margin, an additional dollar
of losses would also be carried back, with the firm obtaining an additional
tax refund at the statutory corporate tax rate.
If the firm cannot carry all its current losses back, it must carry them
forward. In each of the next fifteen years (changed from five by the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981) that its taxable income is positive, it may deduct
the losses until either losses or income are exhausted. The disadvantage of
carrying losses forward is that they are carried with zero nominal interest
and may expire.
For the firm with losses in more than one year, the calculation for the
second loss (and subsequent ones) follows in the same manner, with the second
loss "stacked" after the first. Carrying back is figured net of previous
losses carried back, and net operating loss deductions induced by losses
carried forward are based on income net of those generated by the earlier
loss.
Finally, firms are not required to carry losses back. In any year in
which losses occur, the firm may choose either not to carry back, or to carry—5-
back to the previous three years. It may not carry back selectively to one or
two of the previous three years. Choosing to carry forward could be optimal
for carrying losses back could displace previously taken investment tax
credits. If these credits, in turn, had already been carried forward, they
might expire upon being displaced.
B. Credits
Firms with taxable income before credits have no losses carried forward.
But many have excess credits, and this influences their marginal tax rate.
The two primary tax credits received by corporations are the foreign tax
credit and the investment tax credit.
The rules governing the foreign tax credit are quite complex, and became
more so with the enactment of the 1986 Act. The basic approach is to require
firms to add repatriated foreign income to domestic income in the computation
of taxable income and then permit a credit for foreign taxes paid on the
foreign source income, against U.S. taxes on that income. Firms with positive
worldwide taxable income will be unable to use all such credits for one of two
reasons:
(1) the effective foreign tax rate is higher than the U.S. rate, so that
the U.S. tax liability on foreign source income is exhausted by the
credits,
(2) the firm has domestic losses; in this case, the firm may only use
foreign tax credits to offset the tax on its worldwide income, i.e.,
its foreign source income net of domestic losses.
These two cases have fundamentally different implications. In case (1), an-6-
additional dollar of domestic income is fully taxable, so that the foreign tax
credit carryforwards are irrelevant for our purposes. In the second case, a
reduction in domestic losses would have no effect on tax payments,
simply reducing the foreign tax credits being carried forward. Hence, firms
with domestic loses but positive total income are in a tax position quite
similar to firms with net losses, paying no taxes and carrying forward foreign
tax credits rather than losses.
After foreign tax credits have been subtracted, firms compute their
investment tax credits. (The ITC was repealed in 1986 but was in place
throughout our sample period.)
Until 1986, firms could offset all taxes up to 25,000 dollars and 85
percent of all taxes in excess of 25,000 dollars with investment tax credits.
Before 1978, the percentage was 50 percent. Were there no such limitation,
unused credits could simply be combined with tax losses in calculating the
firm's tax position, as in the second foreign tax credit example. With the
credit limit, a firm with taxable income but facing credit constraints was
effectively taxed at a low positive rate on its marginal income, since the
addition of more income allowed it to increase the credits that it uses.
Since investment tax credits were calculated after losses for foreign tax
credits had been subtracted from taxable income, firms with substantial
current domestic income could be credit constrained if loss and foreign tax
credit carryforward from earlier years were used to offset this income.
Moreover, as mentioned above, a firm could displace credits it had already
used if a subsequent loss were carried back to the current year, reducing
allowable credits. Credits then had to be carried back or carried forward,
even though they were allowable on the firm's initial tax return for the year.-7—
C.Summary
Figure 1 (which is very similar to one presented by Majd and Myers 1985)
pictures the tax function for a typical firm, ignoring the ability of firms to
carry losses and credits back. Current domestic income is onthe horizontal
axis. The tax on that income is on the vertical axis. The firm will be in
one of three regimes. If its tax loss carryforwards and foreign tax credits
(current and carried forward) exceed current taxable income, it pays no taxes.
This occurs in the example if its domestic income is less than V1. We refer
to this situation as state 1.In state 1, firms carry foreign tax credits
and/or losses forward. If Y>V1, the firm pays taxes, but unless Y>Y, it
cannot use up all of its accumulated investment tax credits. We refer to this
intermediate regime as state 2. The fully taxable regime, where no investment
tax credits are carried forward, is referred to as state 0.
The current marginal tax rate (i.e., the derivative of current taxes with
respect to current income in these three states) is 0, T(1-a), and T,
respectively, where a is the percent of taxes that investment tax credits may
offset. However, there are additional effects on future (and previous) taxes
that cause the effective marginal tax rates to differ from these values.
These are discussed in section 4.
3.Data
The data set employed in this project comes from the Treasury Department
Corporate Tax Model. The Treasury data set consists of thirteenannual
samples of corporate tax returns for the years 1970-82. We omit financial
companies because of their different tax rules.2 Because there are many-8-
missing observations for 1970, we limit our consideration to the period
beginning in 1971. Likewise, we ignore firms with assets under 10 million
dollars in 1982 because such firms are intentionally incompletely sampled at
source and account for only a trivial fraction of nonfinancial corporate
assets (about 3 percent).
By combining the annual samples, we are able to create a twelve-year
panel of corporate tax returns. As discussed above, a firm's marginal tax
rate depends not only on its current tax status but also its future and past
ones, so such a data set is necessary to perform such calculations. Indeed,
because of data limitations the firm's current state itself can often only be
inferred by looking at several years of data simultaneously. Unfortunately,
the attrition caused by requiring that there be no missing observations
between 1971 and 1982 is significant. From a sample of 15,575 firms present
in our 1982 sample, only 2,808 have complete data for 1971—82. This attrition
is strongly related to size, as over half of all nonfinancial corporate assets
are accounted for by firms in the panel. (The attrition is not due solely or
even primarily to births or deaths of firms. In a large fraction of the
cases, for example, firms with missing data have data in noncontiguous years.)
Our approach, therefore, is to use the smaller panel data set for calculations
requiring such data and then impute values of calculated variables for the
remainder of the annual samples for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982. The
imputation includes a correction for sample selection bias.
Classified by industry, the 1971—82 panel includes 23 firms in
Agriculture, 89 in Mining, 103 in Construction, 1533 in Manufacturing, 361 in
Transportation, 545 in Trade and 154 in Services. As measured by book assets-9-
(the only size measure available to us), this represents 61 percent of the
universe for Manufacturing, 49 percent for Mining, and 76 percent for
Transportation. For the remaining industries, however, the sampling is
considerably worse: 24 percent for Trade, 19 percent for Services, 15 percent
for Construction, and 4 percent for Agriculture. Overall, the firms in our
sample account for 53 percent of the universe of nonfinancial corporate book
assets, and a somewhat larger percentage of those in the universe of firms
with assets over 10 million dollars.
The Treasury model is built primarily from the Annual IRS Statistics of
Income Corporation File. A subset of the income, tax and balance sheet items
reported by each corporation on its annual federal income tax return (form
1120) are recorded each year.For our purposes, however, the data possess
certain limitations. First, they do not contain revised tax returns that were
filed in cases where firms carried back losses or credits. Second,
corporations are not required to report the magnitude of losses carried
forward, only those deducted in a given year. Together, these limitations
prevent immediate inference of the loss carryforward or loss carryback that
each firm has in a given year. These variables are of interest in their own
right, and are also necessary for the calculation of effective marginal tax
rates. For example, a firm reporting negative taxable income could be
carrying losses back, or carrying them forward, or both. In the first of
these cases, it would be fully taxable on marginal income, while in the second
and third cases it would pay no additional taxes.
To correct this omission, we employ an algorithm to simulate the
evolution of each firm's tax status, comprising its tax loss carryforward-10-
stock and its potential for carrying back. The algorithm, which is described
in more detail in Appendix A, uses the period 1971-75 as a base period from
which to derive initial conditions which are updated according to each
subsequent tax return. In some cases, no special assumptions are necessary.
For example, a firm with taxable income and no net operating loss deduction in
1973, 1974 and 1975 begins in 1976 with no loss carryforward and the carryback
potential equal to the previous three years' income. In other cases, however,
some assumption about years before 1971 is necessary. For example, if the
firm had income without loss deductions in 1971 and 1972, followed by three
consecutive years of losses, one cannot know how much of these losses were
carried back without knowing the carryback potential offered by taxable income
in 1970. In this case, we assume that 1970 offered no such potential,
although we did experiment with other assumptions.
In all, we classified firms into one of four mutually exclusive
categories based on tax data for 1971-75, using assumptions about earlier
years where necessary to generate 1976 initial conditions. Varying our
assumptions about earlier tax years did not appear to exert a significant
impact on our results.
Once each firm's 1975 carryforward/carryback potential has been
established, the algorithm takes reported taxable income in each subsequent
year and updates the firm's tax status. Accurate calculation required
incorporation of relevant tax code changes, such as the extension in 1981 from
five to fifteen years of the maximum period for all tax loss carryforwards
then on the books (dating back to 1976) and the extension in the same year of
the period for all credit carryforwards (dating back to 1974), also to fifteen
years.—11—
A second tax code change concerns the rules governing carrying back.
Since 1976, firms with net operating losses have had the option of
relinquishing the entire carryback period. As discussed above, the major
factor motivating firms to eschew carrying back is the potential displacement
of investment tax credits whose use could then be jeopardized. Determining
whether firms face this situation requires the integration of data on
investment tax credits, credit limitations and investment tax credit
carryforward vintages with the data on losses and taxable income. Due to the
complexity of doing this, we experimented with different simple behavioral
assumptions about when firms choose to carry back. The two that seemed to
perform best were that firms always carry back when possible, or carry back
only if they were unconstrained in each of the three preceding years. For
each firm, we simulated the path of tax payments and net operating loss
deductions for 1976-82 deriving from these two alternative behavioral
assumptions, and chose the method that minimized the sum of absolute
deviations of predicted from actual net operating loss deductions for that
firm. Of the 2,808 firms, 178 were estimated to use the first method (always
carry back) and 65 the second method (carry back only into years without loss
or credit constraints on the initial tax returns). The remaining 2,565 firms,
many of which never had any losses, gave the same results under each
assumption.
Unlike loss carryforwards, investment tax credit (ITC) carryforwards are
reported on corporate tax returns. Thus, we know immediately whether the
firms faced limitations on the use of credits in each year.3 While we do not
observe foreign tax credits carried forward, we can identify those firms—12—
carrying them forward because of domestic losses. These are firms who offset
all of their taxes before credits with foreign tax credits.
In the aggregate, our simulations track the net operating losses of
individual firms quite well. There are persistent errors in some cases,
however, leading to an underprediction rate averaging about 6 percent per year
with no obvious trend.
There are many possible explanations for this underprediction.Many of
the NOL deductions we miss appear to come from firms which continually report
loss deductions far below their taxable income. Normally, this should not
happen in consecutive years. A small NOL deduction in one year should
indicate that the stock of carryforwards has been exhausted, and our algorithm
is structured to assume this. One possible reason for the observed pattern is
the presence of firms whose records consolidate the returns of several
subsidiaries, some with losses and some with taxable inconie. A second cause
could be the acquisition of firms with tax losses. Our information does not
allow us to determine the relative importance of these potential sources of
observed prediction errors. A third source of error is our algorithm, which
assumes that firms follow a fairly simple decision rule about whether to carry
losses back. As we already indicated, one could, in theory, use information
on the size of taxable income and tax credits in each year to determine a more
complicated decision rule, but this would be a difficult procedure to
implement. This underprediction of net operating loss deductions suggests
that we will slightly underpredict the value of tax losses carried forward, as
well. This is worth keeping in mind when we present our estimates for tax
loss carryforwards in the aggregate.—13—
4.The Importance of Tax Constraints
Table 1 presents the results of our calculations for 1976—82. The top
panel shows the unweighted fraction of the firms in our sample facing no
constraints ("taxable"), loss and credit constraints ("nontaxable"), and
taxable but facing credit constraints ("credit constrained"). As above, we
refer to these as states 0, 1 and 2, respectively. State 1 includes those
firms that report positive taxable income before tax credits but offset all
taxes with foreign tax credits. The fraction of the sample in this subregime
is listed in parentheses next to the state 1 sample fraction. Fairly stable
for the period 1976—80, the fraction of firms in the nontaxable state did fall
somewhat during the expansion of the late 1970s and increase in the recession
year 1980. It then rose noticeably in 1981 and especially in 1982. Note
that, except in recent years, a greater fraction of the sample firms were in
state 2 than state 1, emphasizing the importance of taking credit constraints
into account. The fraction of firms with negative taxable income that carry
losses forward, and hence are in state 1, ranges between .52 and .60,
suggesting that the opportunity to carry losses back is also important.
The results change markedly once one weights by firm asset size. Until
1981, the weighted percentage of firms in state 1 is well below the unweighted
percentage, meaning that losses were concentrated among smaller firms.
However, this pattern changes in 1981, and by 1982 over 22 percent of the
sample assets are held by nontaxable firms.4 Another significant effect of
weighting is the increased importance of foreign tax credits as a cause of
firms being nontaxable. In the 1980s, over 5 percent of the firms (asset
weighted) have positive taxable income before foreign tax credits but pay no-14-
taxes at all. The most significant effect of weighting, however, is on the
size of the state 2 population. Once weighted by assets, the fraction of
firms that pay taxes and have ITC carryforwards increases to a range of
between 27 and 35 percent.
As discussed above, firm size is a major factor explaining inclusion in
our data panel. Since size is also related to firm tax status, the results
for the sample are not necessarily representative of those for the universe of
nonfinancial corporations. Therefore, we impute values of the tax loss
carryforward for the remaining nonfinancial corporations with assets over 10
million dollars for each of the years 1980, 1981 and 1982, and use the imputed
values, along with information on foreign and investment tax credits, to
classify firms by state. Because unexplained variation in attrition may be
correlated with tax losses, we include a correction for sample selection bias,
following Heckman (1979). To minimize attrition from the panel, we base our
1980 and 1981 imputations on panels of firms with complete data through 1980
and 1981, respectively. Further details are provided in Appendix B.
The last panel in Table 1 gives the resulting estimates for universe
population fractions for each state, weighted by assets, for the years
1980-82. The results do confirm our prediction that losses are more prevalent
in the universe than in our panel, but the differences in fractions are small.
The results in Table 1 lead to a number of important conclusions. First,
the number of nontaxable firms increased markedly in the early 1980s. Second,
the distribution of unused tax losses, foreign tax credits and investment tax
credits is strongly related to firm size. Finally, by 1982 about half the
nonfinancial corporate assets were held by firms that were not fully taxable.- 15-
Though the picture emerges that losses alone affected a relatively small
minority of firms, even in 1981 and 1982, the incidence of losses is not
spread evenly across different industries. This is demonstrated in Table 2,
which gives the asset-weighted universe calculations for 1980-82 corresponding
to the aggregate statistics in the last panel of Table 1, repeated at the top
of Table 2. The manufacturing firms in our sample are slightly more likely to
have experienced losses than other firms, but also more likely to be fully
taxable. The oil industry was less likely to be nontaxable, during this
period, while the other three industries experience was quite different. By
1982, only between 13 and 21 percent of the assets in Airlines, Railroads and
Steel were held by firms not carrying forward losses or credits.
Having explored the pervasiveness of constraints on tax losses and
credits, for the nonfinancial corporate universe, we turn next to an
evaluation of the overall magnitude of these unused tax benefits.
The results of our calculations are presented in Table 3. Also presented
are estimates of end-of-year investment tax credit carryforwards, provided by
the Statistics of Income Corporation Tax Returns volumes. We present three
sets of estimates of tax losses. Those in parentheses are for firms in the
1971-80 panel, and are provided to indicate the trend in losses through 1980.
Clearly, losses were increasing in importance even as the economy improved
through the late 1970s, and jumped in the recession year of 1980.
The column labelled "no correction" gives estimated loss carryforwards
for the universe of nonfinancial corporations (above 10 million in assets)
with values imputed for firms not in the panel but without any correction for
sample selection bias. The third column give universe estimates that-16-
incorporate such a correction, which is extremely important for 1981 and1982.
Other evidence supports the explosion in tax losses depicted here.Using
published aggregate statistics, one can determine the current losses of the
nonfinancial corporate sector. By subtracting from these the lossescarried
back (which are available only for the corporate sectoras a whole, and hence
slightly overstated), one obtains an estimate of the flow added to the stock
of losses carried forward. This is an absolute lower boundon the stock
itself. For the years 1980, 1981, and 1982, this lower bound is36.6 billion
dollars, 51.1 billion dollars, and 75.6 billion dollars, respectively,5
suggesting that even our corrected numbers are too low for 1980 and,perhaps,
1982.
Since the revenue cost of tax deductions is obtainedby multiplying these
deductions by the corporate tax rate, which was .46 during thisperiod, we may
conclude that the value of tax losses being carried forward exceeded thatof
unused investment tax credits in the early 1980s, as the combinedstock of
carryforwards grew to a level that in 1982 exceeded annualcorporate tax
collections.
In concluding our discussion of the numbers in Table 3,we note how much
the stocks of carryforwards have risen in recentyears relative to the
fraction of the corporate population facing constraints. Thissuggests that
the importance of the problem facing constrained firmsmay have increased, in
that firms may be less likely to work of f such large accumulatedtax losses
and credits over a short period.We now develop a methodology for estimating
the impact of prolonged presence in a tax constrained state.—17—
5.A Model of Tax Status Transitions
In order to estimate the effective marginal tax rate that a firm faces in
a given year, information is necessary not only about its current state, but
also the prospective future ones. A firm in state 1 (nontaxable) this year
clearly has a zero current marginal tax rate on additional income, but this
understates the present value of taxes associated with that income, since the
income will reduce losses carried forward and result in an increase in tax
payments in the year that the firm exhausts its loss carryforwards and resumes
payment of taxes. On the other hand, the current tax on a taxable firm's
marginal income overstates the present value of taxes associated with that
income, since the increased tax also increases the potential f or carrying back
future losses to offset the tax. The extent of these adjustments for future
taxes depends on the transition patterns among the three states defined above
(taxable, nontaxable, credit constrained). For example, if firms move quickly
out of the nontaxable state, the effective marginal tax rate may be close to
the statutory rate.
To estimate such transition patterns in a short panel such as the one we
have, one can assume that the evolution of the firm's state is determined by a
low order stochastic process. Using a two-state model (which grouped together
fully taxable and credit constrained firms) Auerbach andPoterba (1987a)found
that a first-order transition process could be statistically rejected in favor
of a second-order process, where the current transition probabilities depend
on the current and previous year's state.
The rejection of a first-order process is not surprising, since one would
expect heterogeneity among firms in a given state relating to the lengthof-18-
time spent in that state. Being nontaxable for a long time may indicate that
the firm began with a very large tax loss carryforward which made transitions
unlikely, or that the firm has had continually poor performance. Either of
these explanations would predict that firms would be more likely to remain
nontaxable if they had been so for the past two years rather than just the
most recent year, which is what Auerbach and Poterba found. Their solution
was to model transitions as a second-order process, which can be extended in
the current three state model.
Once the model has been estimated, it can be used to estimate effective
marginal tax rates for firms in different states regarding current tax status.
Under the assumption that the estimated transition probabilities apply to the
representative, optimizing firm, we may use them to estimate the path that a
marginal accrued tax liabilility would take starting from any initial state.
Doing so leads to the computation of "shadow" values of future tax liabilities
associated with current tax accruals.
This approach of using transition model estimates to calculate shadow
values was developed by Auerbach and Poterba, but the current extension
involves substantial complication, not only because there are more states to
consider, but also because the source of a change in accrued tax liability
(ordinary income or tax credits) matters once the separate constraint on
credits is included in the analysis.
We begin with some notation. Letijk be the probability that a firm now
in state j, and in state i during the previous year, will move to state k next
year. For simplicity, we may also refer to the current state as ii and next
year's state as jk. Let a be the fraction of taxes, before credits but after-19-
accounting for loss carryforwards and carrybacks, that by law may be offset by
credits, credit carrybacks and credit carryforwards.
Three general comments are in order before discussing the derivation of
the shadow values from estimates of ijk• First, as already mentioned, the
shadow values will differ according to whether the marginal income change is
associated with ordinary income or credits. Second, the state the firm was in
during the previous year will affect the current shadow value, given this
year's state, because future transition probabilities depend on both years'
states in the second—order transition model. Third, the shadow values to be
derived apply symmetrically to positive and negative marginal tax changes. If
we wish to trace through the impact of a change in tax credits accrued today,
it doesn't matter whether this change is positive or negative. For example,
if the firm is carrying credits forward, an increase in credits will increase
the stock carried forward and reduce the tax payments when the firm reaches
state 0; a decrease in credits will reduce the carryforward and increase taxes
by the same amount in state 0. The key is that we are concentrating on
marginal changes that do not affect the transition probabilities themselves.
Consider now the shadow values of tax payments accrued by a firm in a
state in which the taxes must be carried forward. For tax credits, this is
states 1 and 2, since an increase (decrease) in tax credits in either state
simply increases (decreases) the stock of credits being carried forward.
These marginal credits will affect the firm's tax liability only when it
reaches state 0 and is fully taxable at the margin.
Let PRC(t) be the probability that the firm starting in state ij
(j=1,2) first enters state 0 from state 1 and after t years. PRC(t) is
the probability that it first enters state 0 from state 2 and in year t. The
derivation of these "probabilities of becoming taxable" is discussed below.-20—
Letting IC be the maximum number of years that credits may be carried forward,




whereis the nominal, after-tax discount factor and vc10 is the shadow value
that a change in tax credits has in state 10 in terms of the change in
subsequent carryback potential. These terms appear because the use of the
accrued credits will offset income that could, potentially, have permitted a
carryback of subsequent losses or excess credits. The year limit IC appears
since a change in credits carried forward will have no impact if credits at
the margin expire anyway.6
A change in ordinary tax liability (i.e., taxes before credits) will, as
with a change in credits, be charged immediately if it occurs in state 0 and
carried forward if occurring in state 1. In state 2, however, it will affect
both current taxes and tax credits carried forward. A decline of one dollar
of ordinary tax liability will force the firm to use a fewer dollars of tax
credits. Hence, we may view a reduction in tax liability as being partially
realized (at rate 1-a) with the rest (a) being "converted" to credit
carryforwards. An increase in tax liability works symmetrically, with credit
carryforwards being reduced but some tax paid.
Letting PR(t) be the probability of a firm starting in state ii first
leaving state 1 in year t and into state 0, and PR(t) be the probability
of the same firm first leaving state 1 in year t and into state 2, we may
express the shadow value of a dollar of ordinary taxes accrued in state ii as:—21—
(2) w. =titt)(1-v10)+PR(t)(awc12+(1-a)(1-v12)]}(i=O,1,2)
where I is the number of years that losses can be carried forward and v is
the shadow value of ordinary tax payments in state ii.
Next, consider the shadow values v and vc13. In computing them, we
note that firms are permitted to carry losses and credits back three years.
As discussed above, firms have had the option since 1976 of not carrying
losses back. Initially, however, we will assume that losses are always
carried back when this is possible. If firms follow this policy, then a
firm's presence in state I or state 2 means it has already exhausted its
ability to carry back losses or credits, respectively.
The shadow values vc10 are associated with credits used in state iO
(i=O,1,2). A decrease in credits will permit additional carrying back of
losses or credits in the first year of the following three that the firm
passes into state 1 or state 2. These credits will then not be carried
forward. If the firm passes into state 2, a credit that otherwise would have
been carried forward can be carried back. If it passes into state 1, then it
will reduce the current credits displaced and carried forward when the losses
were carried back from state 1. However, it is possible that no such
displaced credits were carried forward. When losses carried back displace
previous credits, the firm may, in turn, carry these credits back another
three years. This is not possible for the firm in state 10 or 20, for it came
into the current year facing credit constraints. However, some firms in state
00 might have had sufficient capacity to carry back every displaced credit,
making the reduction in such displacement valueless. For simplicity, we—22—
assume this to be the case for all firms in state 00. Thus, we may express




We next consider the shadow value of ordinary tax payments that the firm
makes in state 0. These can have value if the firm moves into state 1 or 2 in
the next three years. In addition, if the firm passes into state 2 and then
state 1 within the three year period, it first carries back credits to offset
a of the additional income, and then carries back losses offsetting all of the
income but displacing credits initially carried back. Taking all these







An extra dollar of taxes paid in state 2 is the result of an increase in
tax liability before credits of 11(1-a) dollars and an increase in tax credits
of a/(1-a) dollars. A carryback to this state can occur only from state 1. If






This completes the specification of the shadow values. To obtain a system of
equations for the shadow prices in terms of the transition probabilities
alone, however, it is necessary to express the "probabilities until taxable"
PR and PRC in terms of the transition probabilities p. This may be done
recursively, with initial conditions determined by the firm's initial state.
We briefly sketch the procedure. In year 1, we have (suppressing the
superscripts on PR and PRC):
(6) PRCko(1) =0P00
+ + (k=1,2)
where q13=1 if ij is the firm's initial state (indicated by the superscript of
PRC) and 0 otherwise. Defining the auxiliary probability PRCkm(t) as the
probability of the firm going from state k to state m in year t without having
passed through state 0 between date 0 and date t-1, we have, for year 1:
(7) PRCkm(l) = + + (k,m=1,2)
For t >1,we then have the recursive expression starting with the year 1 values
defined in (6) and (7):
(8) PRCkm(t) =PRClk(tl)Plkm
+PRC2k(tl)P2km (k,m=1,2)




where, again, the state indicator equals 1 if and only if the firm's
initial state is ij, and zero otherwise.





Fort >1,we have the recursive expression starting with the year 1 value
defined in (10):
(11) PR1k(t) =PR11(t—l)pllk (i=0.l,2)
Expressions (6)-(11) provide solutions for the vectors PR and PRC in
terms of the transitions probabilities p. as was desired. Thereafter, we have
a system of 18 linear equations ((1)—(5)) in 18 unknown shadow values (v0,
v12, vc10, w11, wc1 wc, i=0,1,2). Though tedious, the solution is
straightforward.
The algorithm developed thus far is based on the assumption that firms
always carry back losses and credits where possible. As indicated above,
however, we also consider the possibility that a firm carries back only when
it faced no constraints during the prior three years. This would change
expressions (3)-(5) for the shadow values of tax payments. The alternative
versions of these expressions are derived in Appendix C.—25—
6.Transition Probabilities and Marginal Tax Rates
In this section of the paper, we present second-order transition
probabilities for the three-state model developed above, estimated from our
1971-82 panel of firms taken from the Treasury tax model. We then use the
shadow value algorithm developed in the previous section to estimate the
shadow values of tax payments and loss and credit carryforwards. These shadow
values have several useful applications, of which we demonstrate two. First,
we estimate the average effective marginal tax rate at which firms deduct
interest payments. Then, in section 7, we estimate the effective tax rates
that firms in different initial states face on marginal investment projects
with different real and tax attributes.
Table 4 presents estimates of the transitions matrix for the 1971—82
panel of firms for the full sample period (1976-82). Though estimates using
firms weighted by asset size are presented, those based on the unweighted
sample were similar.
As suggested above, a first-order transition process is unlikely to be
very accurate in predicting the movement of firms across states. For example,
a firm in state 00 is much more likely to stay in state 0 than firms in states
10 and 20. This is to be expected, since presence in state 0 for two
successive years indicates more "distance from the constrained state. A
somewhat different persistence pattern is observed for firms in states 1 and
2. For each state, a firm that has been in that state for two years is more
likely to persist in that state than a firm that previously entered that state
from state 0. That is, P111 >P011and P222 >P022.However, P122 >P222and
>P011,suggesting that there may be substantial mobility among the-26-
constrained states I. and 2. Once again, this confirms the importance of
considering state 2 distinctly rather than grouping taxable credit-constrained
firms with those in state 0.
The table indicates a fair degree of persistence in state 0. Over 80
percent of all firms unconstrained for at least two years could be expected to
remain so for another year. There is also a lot of persistence in state 1.
Again nearly 80 percent of the firms not taxable for at least two years are
not taxable for at least one more year. The estimates suggest presence in
state 2 is somewhat less long-lived, as one might expect given its
intermediate position between taxable and not taxable. In general, firms that
transited to or from state 0 in the previous year are more likely to transit
again than those in the current state for at least two years. Indeed, firms
in state 02 are more likely to return to state 0 than they are to stay in
state 2, confirming the view that there is less "permanence" about this state.
The transition probabilities in Table 4 may now be incorporated into the
shadow pricing algorithm presented in the previous section to derive shadow
prices of tax payments and carryforwards in different states. The
calculations apply to a representative firm facing the transition matrix in
every year. As we have discussed, there is substantial heterogenity in the
sample with respect to the incidence of tax constraints, and the transition
probabilities change over time. Taking full account of these variations would
involve the use of imprecisely estimated transition probabilities (based in
many cells on very small samples) and a substantially more sophisticated model
than the already complex one introduced in the last section. Calculations
based on sample averages are still quite useful in determining the overall
impact of tax status transitions.—27-
Table 5 presents the shadow values estimated for the 1982 tax rules under
the assumption that firms always choose to carry back losses when possible.8
We assume a nominal after—tax discount rate (1/-1) of 7 percent. The first
two columns present shadow values for tax payments associated with the
potential carrybacks facilitated. These act to reduce the effective marginal
tax rates for taxable firms. The last two columns give the shadow values for
firms not paying the accrued taxes, indicating the present value of each
dollar of these taxes that is carried forward. Not every cell in the table
has an entry. There are no taxes carried forward from state 0, and no taxes
paid -in state 1. State 2 is a hybrid, since credits are carried forward but
the firm does pay some taxes on ordinary income.
As one would expect, the shadow value for ordinary tax payments made in
state 0 is smallest in state 00, and largest in state 10. That is because the
firm in state 10 is more likely to return to a constrained state and benefit
from the ability to carry losses or credits back. Income taxes associated
with a reduction in tax credits generally have a higher shadow value because
of their greater ability to absorb tax credit carrybacks in the future. On
the other hand, tax credits accrued in state 1 have less value than additions
to ordinary tax losses, since their subsequent use is subject to the
additional restriction on the use of credits to offset taxable income. In
state 11, for example, each dollar of credits carried forward has a present
value of only 35.2 cents. Credits carried forward from state 2 have much
greater value than those carried forward from state 1 because of the much
greater likelihood of the firms entering state 0 from state 2 than from
state 1.—28-
The figures in the table indicate that, despite the persistence noted in
Table 4, there is enough movement into and out of state 0 to impart a high
shadow value to tax payments in that state. Even a firm that has been fully
taxable f or at least two successive years can expect to recoup 16 percent of
its tax payments, in present value, by carrying back subsequent net operating
losses and excess tax credits. Combined with the shadow values of
carryforwards in state 1, this implies a narrowing of the gap between the
different states in effective marginal tax rates, compared to the
contemporaneous gap between the full corporate rate and zero.
Given our shadow values, it is simple to construct these effective
marginal tax rates. For a taxpaying firm, the tax rate equals the tax on an
extra dollar of ordinary income less the shadow value that income generates.
For a firm in state 1, the tax rate equals the shadow value of a dollar of
ordinary losses carried forward. That is, the effective marginal tax rate in
state ij is the statutory tax rate, T, multiplied by 0, where:
(12) 0 =(F-vo) (i0,1,2; j0)
(i=0,1,2 j=1)
((1—a)(1—v12)+awc12] (i=O,1,2; j=2)
It will also be useful for subsequent calculations to compare the value
of 0 for tax payments associated with investment tax credits, rather than
ordinary income. We would expect this to be lower for three reasons. First,
unlike losses, credits cannot be used at all in state 2. Second, credits
carried forward cannot be used at all in a future state 2. Third, tax
payments associated with credits have a higher shadow value than those-29-
associated with ordinary income, since they can be offset completely by future
excess credits, not just at rate a.9 We have;
(13) =(1—vc0) (i0,1,2; j0)
wcj1 (i=O,1,2; j1)
wc12 (i0,1,2; j2)
The second panel in Table 5 presents estimates of the values of these
marginal "effective inclusion" rates, 0 and 0 based on the shadow values in
the table. The effective tax rate on ordinary income equals the value of 9
multiplied by the statutory tax rate. At the 1982 statutory tax rate of 46
percent, the effective marginal tax rates for corporations vary from a high at
38.6 percent in state 00 to a low of 18.9 percent in state 11, a difference of
19.7 rather than 46 percentage points.
These marginal tax rates on ordinary income are those that are relevant
for determining the corporate tax advantage from borrowing. As stressed in
our introduction, one of the most important effects attributed to the limited
loss offset present in the tax system is that it could conceivably explain the
existence of interior debt-equity ratios as an optimal policy of the firm.
The argument is extremely simple. Despite the apparent tax advantage to
borrowing, firms might reach a point where marginal interest deductions
receive such a small deduction, in present value, that other factors, such as
the personal tax advantage to equity (via the treatment of capital gains)
balances what remains of the advantage of interest deductibility, Clearly,
the restrictions are more important for the firm in state 11 than the firm in
state 00. One measure of its overall importance is the average of the-30—
different marginal tax rates across the different tax states, weighted by
assets of firms in the different states. The last row in Table 5, gives such
averages, based on the average state population fractions for the entire
sample period.10 The implied average marginal rate of deduction for interest
payments is 31.8 percent. This is quite close to the estimate by Cordes and
Sheffrin (1983) (who reported a value of .31 for a 1978 sample based on 1983
law) but considerably below those of Auerbach (1983) and Auerbach and Poterba
(1987b). It suggests that the combination of all tax constraints, including
investment and foreign tax credits, must be considered in any model attempting
to explain corporate borrowing decisions.
7. The Effective Tax Rate on Investment
As in previous studies (Auerbach 1983, Auerbach and Poterba 1987a), we
may also consider the impact of loss and credit restrictions on the incentives
for firms to invest. This is more complicated than the marginal tax rate
calculations just presented for several reasons.
First, an investment project generates tax liabilities over several
years. In order to estimate the impact of the tax code, one must arrive at a
method of aggregating these tax payments into a single statistic. The
standard approach is to calculate an "effective tax rate," equal to the
proportional difference between the project's internal rates of return before
and after taxes.
A second difficulty is that, in the current context, the firm's marginal
tax rate depends on its state, and this state is likely to change over time.
For example, a firm currently in state 00 is not certain to remain there over—31—
time. As time goes on, there is an increasing probability that it will
experience state 1 or state 2. Likewise, the "loser" in state 11 will, with
some probability, reach state 0 or state 2. To account for this we must, when
evaluating the marginal tax rate on tax accruals at different future dates,
apply the probabilities of each state occurring at each date, conditional on
the state observed initially at date 0. As in earlier work, we estimate these
future state probabilities by applying the estimated transition matrix
recursively to the initial state distribution of the firm. Given our
modelling of transitions, this means that the effective marginal tax rates
over time for different firms will converge, as the initial state condition
becomes less important.
The final problem introduced by loss and credit limitations is one
ignored in earlier studies. For a given state, the effective marginal tax
rate a firm faces depends on whether the accrued tax liability is associated
with ordinary income or credits. For example, investments in equipment have
traditionally received the investment tax credit in the year of investment,
along with a substantial first-year depreciation allowance. Given the
additional limitations on the use of credits, however, it is likely that the
credit is less valuable than a deduction of equal, after-tax value. This is
easily accommodated by our analysis, since we have calculated separate shadow
values for the two different types of tax accruals.
Our approach to estimating the impact of the tax system on the incentive
to invest proceeds as follows. First, we posit an asset with an associated
cash flow stream and tax accruals determined by the tax code. Second, we
posit the firm's state at date 0, and calculate the state probability-32-
distribution at each subsequent date. Third, we estimate theaverage
effective marginal tax rate on credit-type and ordinary income at each date,
using this conditional state probability distribution and the shadow values
estimated above. Fourth, we apply these effective marginal rates to the
accrued tax payments calculated for each date in the first step. Finally, we
estimate the effective tax rate on the investment as the proportional
difference between the before-tax internal rate of return and the internal
rate of return of expected cash flows, after-tax.
Table 6 presents estimates of the effective tax rates on investment for
firms in three different states as well as the average effective tax rates
over all nine states. Also presented for comparison are the effective tax
rates that would prevail under a system with full loss and credit offset. Two
assets are considered. One is a representative piece of equipment, qualifying
for the full investment tax credit and having an exponential depreciation rate
of 12.25 percent. The other is a representative building, which does not
receive the investment tax credit and depreciates exponentially at 3.61
percent.11 Both assets are assumed to deliver a real, certainreturn, after
depreciation, of 6 percent, and are assumed to be financed entirely by equity
(and hence generating no additional interest deductions). We apply the
provisions of the 1982 tax law, with a corporate tax rate of 46 percent, the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) for both equipment and structures, and
a 10 percent investment tax credit for equipment.
As is well known, ACRS lowered effective tax rates (ignoring loss and
credit constraints) substantially. This is quite evident from thenegative
tax rate on equipment under a hypothetical system of full loss offset. This-33-
negative tax rate simply indicates a present value of depreciation deductions
and investment tax credits in excess of the taxes due on the asset's gross
quasirents.
The effects of tax constraints are to lower the average effective tax
rates for structures but to raise them slightly for equipment. To understand
this result, consider the effective tax rates for firms in selected states for
each of the assets. We choose the three states where the firm has been
taxable for two years, nontaxable for two years, and credit-constrained for
two years, respectively.
As is evident from the table, the tax system's constraints affect
different firms in quite different ways that depend on the investments chosen.
The taxable firm encounters the lowest effective tax rate on equipment, the
nontaxable firm the highest. For structures, however, tax status is of little
importance, despite the fact that firms in each state face lower effective
rates than under a full loss offset system. This pattern is consistent with
earlier findings for two-state models by Auerbach (1983) and Auerbach and
Poterba (1987a). It is explained by the presence of two offsetting effects of
tax constraints.
On the one hand, the presence, or prospect of, tax constraints reduces
all tax payments in present value by pushing them forward in time. On the
other hand, this reduction is greater in the early years for nontaxable firms,
and less for taxable firms, before the different firms converge to the same
long run state distribution. For assets with large immediate tax benefits,
that make early year tax accruals negative, such as equipment, the advantage
goes to the taxable firm. For other assets, such as structures, the advantage-34-
is neglible. That, for structures, the tax rates of all firms are below the
nominal rate simply reflects the importance of the first effect of tax
constraints just alluded to, the pushing back of positive tax payments. For
equipment, however, the tax rate is actually higher for firms in state 1,
since the effects of pushing back early, negative tax payments outweighs the
tax reduction gained by pushing back later, positive ones. This explains why
the average effective tax rate is lower than the statutory rate for
structures, and, given the sample population weights, is slightly higher for
equipment.
8.Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented results based on a large panel of actual
corporate tax returned concerning the importance of tax loss and credit
constraints on the behavior of U.S. corporations. Among our findings have
been:
(1) Taking account of constraints on the use of investment tax credits, a
significant fraction (about ,weightedby book assets) of firms in the
nonfinancial corporate sector have unused tax benefits that must be
carried forward.
(2) This fraction increased substantially in 1981 and 1982 to unprecedented
level s.
(3) The incidence of tax constraints varies by firm size. Larger firms are
more likely to have positive taxable income but also more likely to have
unused foreign and investment tax credits.
(4) The average marginal rate of deduction for interest payments in the early-35-
1980s was just over two-thirds the statutory rate, a fact that could help
justify theories of an optimal interior debt—equity ratio based in part
on the limited deductibility of interest payments.
(5) The presence of tax constraints does not, in itself, imply the
discouragement of investment. We estimate that, on average, it actually
reduces substantially the effective tax rate on some investments.
There are obviously many ways in which this study could be extended. One
that we attempted ourselves was to see how much of the increased incidence of
tax losses in 1981 and 1982 was due to the change in the tax law in 1981
allowing more generous depreciation benefits. Unfortunately, not all the data
from the corporate tax returns (form 1120) were available on the Treasury tax
file. Our attempts at inferring the extra depreciation allowances due to the
change in tax regime produced imprecise estimates. It is still worth
reporting, however, that though actual depreciation exceeded what would have
been predicted on the basis of pre-1981 experience, there was virtually no
change in the number of firms with tax losses associated with this shift. On
this point, one should also cite the evidence presented by Auerbach and
Poterba (1987a) that the major factor behind the reduction in corporate tax
revenues that occurred during this period was a significant decline in the
rate of profit.
The panel data we have used ends in 1982. This is all that is currently
available to us. The addition of more years to the existing panel would
enable us to determine whether the striking increase in loss and credit
carryforwards that occurred in 1981 and 1982 has continued during the recent
economic recovery. At least after the fact, this will aid in the evaluation
of the recently enacted reform of the corporate tax.-36—
Appendix A
In Section 3 above, we described the data used in this paper, pointing
out that raw tax return data do not contain direct information on the presence
and size of tax loss carryforwards. To obtain this important information, we
used the first five years of tax information (1971-75) to establish initial
tax conditions, from which complete information for all subsequent years could
be inferred by applying provisions of the tax code to the data provided.
In each year, we have two relevant pieces of information for each firm:
its taxable income (before credits and net operating loss deductions, but
after deductions of intercorporate dividends), TI, and its net operating loss
deductions, NOLD. Net operating loss deductions cannot exceed taxable income,
when TI is positive. When taxable income is negative, the net operating loss
is zero. Therefore, there are four possible combinations for these two
variables:
A: TI >NOLD=0
B: TI <0;NOLD =0
C: TI =NOLD>0
0: TI >NOLD>0
Case A is the most common. These are firms with positive income and no net
operating loss deductions. We may infer that they have no tax losses being
carried forward. Case B firms are those with negative taxable income, and
hence no NOLD. These firms may or may not have a tax loss carryforward,
depending on whether the losses can be fully carried back to the three—37—
previous tax years. This means that, to determine the carryforward for such
firms, we will need information on potential carrybacks, as well. Firms in
case C are those who are offsetting taxable income to the maximum extent.
These firms have tax loss carryforwards, but the size cannot be inferred
without an examination of their history. Firms in case 0 are those who are
"using up" their tax loss carryforward: since they could take a larger
deduction, we infer that they have no more to take.
Our strategy is to use data for the years 1971—75 to establish either
vintages of tax loss carryforwards or vintages of potential carrybacks for
each firm. We choose the five year period because, at that time, losses could
be carried forward at most five years. Thus, no losses from before 1971 could
be carried forward into 1976. For the majority of firms, we have sufficient
information to deduce the initial conditions without making any assumptions.
For some firms, however, assumptions are required. Where this is so, we
experimented with different assumptions. In most cases, the choice of
assumption made little difference. Where it appeared to matter, we chose the
assumption that gave the best prediction of net operating losses taken after
1975.
As indicated in Section 3, we assigned to firm to four mutually exclusive
classes for calculation of initial conditions. We now discuss the algorthm
used for each of these classes.
I. Firms in case A f or three consecutive base period years.
(1626 firms)
These firms were inferred to begin the subsequent year with no
tax loss carryforward and a potential carryback equal to the
three years' taxable income.-38-
II. Firms who fall into case 0 during the base period.
(720 firms)
These firms were inferred to start the following year with no
tax loss carryforward and a potential carryback equal to the
difference between taxable income and the net operating loss
deduction for the case 0 year.
As mentioned in the text, we did observe firms with
consecutive years of case 0. This occurrence could result
from the continual acquisition of smaller loss firms, or from
the consolidation of separate returns, some in case A and some
in case 0. This is probably the major reason for our
understatement of net operating loss deductions in the period
after 1976.
III. Firms experiencing at least one year (but fewer than three
consecutively) of positive income without NOLOs (case A)
during the base period.
(198 firms)
Many of these firms had losses in the base period before the
case A year but, we may infer, had sufficient carryback
reserves that the losses were carried back to the period
before 1970. For these firms, we start history with the first
case A year in the base period. This has the effect of
assuming that no further carry back to the pre-1971 period
would be possible. In most cases, this is not restrictive.
For example, a firm with losses in 1971 and 1972 and taxable
income without at net operating loss deduction in 1973 would,
for any losses incurred subsequently, be able to carry back no
earlier than 1973. However, in a few cases, our approach may
slightly understate the ability to carry back. For example, a
firm taxable income in 1971 and 1972 and a loss in 1973 might
be able to carry part of the 1973 loss back to 1970.
IV. Firms experiencing no years of case A or case 0 during the
five-year base period.
(264 firms)
These are firms that spent the entire base period losing money
(case 6) or sheltering taxable income fully (case C). They
paid no taxes in any of the years. We assumed that all net
operating loss deductions in the base period came from losses
incurred before 1971. This means establishing a tax loss
carryforward at the end of 1975 equal to the sum of losses—39-.
incurred in the 1971-75 period. An alternative assumption
tried was to start history with the first year of losses and
assume that subsequent base period net operating loss
deductions came from these, and not pre-1971 losses. This
leads to a 1975 carryforward equal to base period losses net
of intervening net operating loss deductions. We opted for
the first assumption on the basis of performance after 1975.
A final imputation that was necessary was the investment tax credits
carried forward at the end of 1982. Our aim here is to determine only whether
they are present, not their size, since aggregate statistics on investment tax
credits carried forward are already provided by the Internal Revenue Service's
Statistics of Income Division.
To infer the presence of tax credit carryforwards at the end of 1982, we
used the following algorithm. Firms which carried credits forward at the end
of 1981 and had tentative ITCs in 1982 in excess of those taken were inferred
to be constrained at the end of 1982 as well. Those who were not constrained
at the end of 1981, but had tentative ITCs in excess of those taken, carried
some credits back. To determined whether they were able to carry all excess
credits back, we assumed that firms which had carried credits back in the
previous year would not be able to carry all their credits back during the
current one as well.-40-
Appendix B
The paper reports estimates for 1980, 1981 and 1982 of state populations
and aggregate tax loss carryforwards for the entire nonfinancial corporate
sector, excluding only firms with less than 10 million dollars in assets in
the respective year. This appendix describes the derivation of these
estimates.
We begin with the panel of firms with complete data from 1971 through the
year in question. These panels have 3343, 3086 and 2808 firms for the periods
1971-80, 1971-81 and 1971-82, respectively. For each year, we then add that
year's tax return data for all other corporations above 10 million in assets
to obtain a universe of all firms. We then take out all those firms for whom
we would know from a single year's tax return that the firm has no tax loss
carryforward, including those in state 1 because they offset all taxable
income with foreign tax credits.
We divided the remaining firms into three classes: those with negative
taxable income, those with positive taxable income equal to net operating loss
deduction, and those with taxable income greater than the (positive) net
operating loss deduction. Firms in this last class should normally be taxable
but, as discussed above, we turned up several cases in studying the panel in
which this appeared not to be so.
For each year, and each of the three classes, we then estimated an
equation relating the ratio of tax loss carryforward to assets to several
explanatory variables taken from that year's tax return, using all firms from
that year's complete panel in that class. (Where the tax loss carryforward-41—
was zero, we followed the approach in Auerbach (1983) and included the f-irm's
potential carryback multiplied by -1.) Among the explanatory variables were
assets, sales, foreign tax credits, investment tax credits, ITC carryforward,
and taxable income. We then used these equations to impute the tax loss
carryforward for firms not in the complete panels and assumed those firms were
in state 1 if the imputed values were positive.
To correct for sample selection bias, we first estimated a probit
equation for sample inclusion before performing the regressions. We added to
the list of explanatory variables the firm's tax return filing date, which
proved to be a significant explanatory variable, consistent with our view that
data problems are an important reason for absence from the panel. We then
constructed and used the appropriate Mills ratio corrections in the
regressions based on firms in the panel and the imputations for firms not in
the panel.
A minor complication is involved in classifying a small number of taxable
firms into state 0 or 2. Firms with tentative investment tax credits in
excess of those claimed, but no investment tax credit carryforward from the
previous year, are in state 2 if they cannot carry all the excess credits back
but remain in state 0 if they can. This classification problem was
encountered for the panel for the last year, 1982 (see Appendix A), but we
cannot use the classification algorithm employed there with only one year of
data. Therefore, we calculate upper and lower bounds for the state 2
population by assuming all or none of these firms are in state 2, and take a
simple average. The difference between the two estimates of the state 2
population is typically quite small.-42-
Appendix C
Section 5 of the text presents expressions for the shadow values of tax
payments under the assumption that firms always carry losses and credits back.
In this appendix, we show how these expressions must be amended when firms
only carry losses back when the carry back period contains no years in which
they already faced constraints. The expressions affected are (3)—(5).
First, firms will never carry losses back into state 2. Since they
cannot carry credits back to this state in any event, we have:
(5') v12 =0 (1=0,1,2)
Second, tax payments in state 0 will not be used to offset tax credits
and, in subsequent years, the tax losses, since this would involve carrying
the losses back to a state 2 year. For a firm in state 10 or state 20 (i.e.
currently taxable but not fully taxable in the previous year), losses will be
carried back to the current year only if the firm is in state 0 for the next
two years as well. Other wise, the three-year carryback period will include
the previous year in which the firm was not in state 0. Thus, for states 10
and 20, (4) in the text is replaced by:
(4.a') v.0 =(P102+2P100p002+3P100p000p002)a(1-wc02)
+3p100p000p001(1-w01) (i=1,2)
Firms initially in state 00, however, will carry back to the currentyear if
state 1 occurs two years hence (after state 0), since by then the three
previous years would all have been state 0.If the firm reaches state 1-'43-
immediately, however, we must allow for the fact that it could have been in
state 1 or state 2 two years before the current one. For the firm currently
in state 00, the probability that 'it was also in state 0 two years ago is:
(Bi) Pr(000IxOO) =(q00p000)/(q00p000+q10p110+q20p200)
where q is the population weight of state ij. Thus, for state 00, (4) in




A similar argument affects the value of taxes associated with changes in
tax credits. For i=1 or 2, expression (3.a) in the text becomes:
(3.a') vc.0 =(p02+$2P00p002+3P100p000p002)(1—wc02)
+3p100p000p001(1-wc01) (i1,2)
Since, as discussed above, losses carried back into state 00 are already
assumed to produce no shadow value for a reduction in tax credits, there is no
change in the shadow value of a change in credits in state 00 caused by the
change in assumption about when firms carry losses back (i.e. (3.b) is
unchanged).-44—
Footnotes
1. Since 1986, a strengthened corporate alternative minimum tax acts as a
second level, parallel tax system, but the minimum tax in place during our
sample period was much less important.
2.Our universe also contains Subchapter S Corporations, which are taxed as
partnerships. Since they represent just over 1 percent of corporate assets,
their inclusion should have an insignificant impact on the results.
3.Actually, each year's return reports the carryforward from the previous
year. Thus, carryforwards from 1982 are not directly available from 1982 tax
returns; to estimate these, we used an algorithm described in Appendix A.
4.Our weighted and unweighted percentages for firms in state 1 for 1981 and
1982 (the only years of overlap) are substantially higher than those found by
Auerbach and Poterba, even if we substract firms in state 1 due to foreign tax
credits. This suggests that losses are more prevalent among the firms with
poor public accounting data that were omitted from their sample.
5.Further details of the method and data source used for this calculation
is provided by Auerbach and Poterba (1987a).
6.This may slightly overstate the average length that marginal changes in
tax credits can be carried forward from state 2.If the firm is in the
process of reducing, rather than increasing, its stock of unused tax credits,
the marginal tax credit in the carryforward stock may have been accrued in an
earlier year. This would make the appropriate expiration date in expression
(1) earlier than IC. A similar issue arises with ordinary losses carried
forward. There does not seem to be any simple way of correcting this rather-45-
minor error.
7.The annual transition patterns vary quite substantially, but we focus on
the sample average to reduce sampling error and because we are interested in
the long run transition patterns.
8.This presents a small problem, because a small number of firms in the
sample on which our transition matrices are based were assumed to follow a
policy of only sometimes carrying losses back. For such firms, the shadow
value algorithm is slightly different (see Appendix C). However, the
difference and the number of firms involved are so small that estimation using
separate transition matrices did not seem worthwhile. All subsequent
calculations also are based on the "always carry back" algorithm given in
section 5.
9.Offsetting these effects is the fact that credits accrued in state 00 may
have reduced value under the assumption, which we have made, that firms will
be able to carry any displaced credits back an additional three years. This
explains why, in table 5, the shadow value of credits is lower in state 00
than the shadow value of ordinary tax payments.
10. The sample state population weights are: 00: .439, 01: .033, 02: .098,
10: .004, 11: .075, 12: .023, 20: .101, 21: .031, 22: .195.
We would prefer to use universe state weights, but we have estimates only
of the state 0, 1 and 2 populations and not the additional breakdown within
each of these states. The major state fractions for the universe, given in
Table 1, are quite close to those calculated for the sample, so the
differences should be small.
11. These depreciation rates are those for general industrial equipment and
industrial buildings estimated by Hulten and Wykoff (1981).-46—
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a -rateof investment tax credit offset
L -taxlosses carried forward from previous year
FTC -currentforeign tax credits accrued plus foreign tax credits carried
forward from the previous year
ITC -currentinvestment tax credits accrued plus investment tax credits
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State definitions: 0 —fullytaxable
1 -nontaxable
2 —taxablebut credit-constrained
Numbers in parentheses are sample fractions of firms in state 1 because of
foreign tax credits.Table 2
Fraction of Firms by State, Weighted by Assets
Selected Industries
State
Year 0 1 2
All Industries
1980 0.552 0.141 (0.045) 0.307
1981 0.552 0.187 (0.053) 0.261
1982 0.483 0.230 (0.054) 0.287
Airlines
1980 0.224 0.413 (0.074) 0.363
1981 0.185 0.630 (0.070) 0.185
1982 0.127 0.618 (0.063) 0.255
Oil
1980 0.566 0.101 (0.051) 0.333
1981 0.587 0.186 (0.102) 0.227
1982 0.525 0.113 (0.042) 0.362
Manufacturing
1980 0.596 0.165 (0.068) 0.239
1981 0.582 0.201 (0.066) 0.217
1982 0.506 0.241 (0.069) 0.253
Railroads
1980 0.200 0.338 (0.000) 0.462
1981 0.120 0.612 (0.000) 0.268
1982 0.211 0.631 (0.000) 0.158
Steel
1980 0.382 0.146 (0.000) 0.472
1981 0.593 0.070 (0.001) 0.337
1982 0.189 0.760 (0.002) 0.051
State definitions: 0 -fullytaxable
1 -nontaxable
2 -taxablebut credit-constrainedTable 3










1980(12.8) 36.2 37.1 15.0
1981 56.4 122.2 18.0
1982 67.2 107.8 21.4
Sources: Losses are for nonfinancial corporations with
assets over 10 million dollars, estimated from our sample.
Credits are for all corporations (except DISCs), and are
taken from the Statistics of Income Corporation Returns.
Numbers in parentheses are those for the 1971-80 panel
alone, and are provided as evidence concerning the trend





00 0.820 0.038 0.142
01 0.153 0.502 0.345
02 0.490 0.059 0.452
10 0.475 0.190 0.336
11 0.029 0.782 0.189
12 0.157 0.139 0.705
20 0.585 0.048 0.367
21 0.011 0.841 0.149
22 0.213 0.123 0.664Table 5
Shadow Values of Tax Payments and Carryforwards
(1982 Tax Rules)
Tax Payments Tax Carryforwards
Ordinary Ordinary

























Notes: For ordinary income, effective tax rate is computed by multiplying
the effective inclusion rate by the statutory marginal tax rate.
For tax credits, the effective credit rate equals the effective
inclusion rate multiplied by the statutory rate of tax credit.Table 6
Effective Tax Rates on Equipment and Structures







Average (all states)-0.067 0.267